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Abstract 
A number of studies have found that firms provide less training if they are located in regions 
with strong labor market competition. This finding is usually interpreted as evidence of a higher 
risk of poaching in these regions. Yet, there is no direct evidence that regional competition is 
positively correlated with poaching. Building on a recently established approach to ex-post 
identify poaching of apprenticeship completers, our paper is the first to directly investigate the 
correlation between regional labor market competition and poaching. Using German adminis-
trative data, we find that competition indeed increases training establishments’ probability of 
becoming poaching victims. However, poaching victims do not change their apprenticeship 
training activity in reaction to past poaching. Instead, our findings indicate that the lower train-
ing activity in competitive regions can be attributed to lower retention rates, a less adverse 
selection, and lower labor and hiring costs of apprenticeship completers hired from rivals. 
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1. Introduction 
Poaching – hiring of employees against the will of the current employer – is an important threat 
to firm-sponsored general training. Both, training firms’ risk of becoming a poaching victim, 
and firms’ willingness and ability to commit poaching are likely to depend on the degree of 
competition in the labor market. Yet, direct empirical evidence on the link between competition 
and poaching is rather scarce. Our aim is to fill this gap in the literature, using an innovative 
empirical strategy to identify poaching and measuring competition at the level of regional oc-
cupational labor markets. Therein, we exploit the institutional peculiarities of the German ap-
prenticeship system. 
We follow up on recent studies which find a negative relationship between regional employer 
competition and firms’ training provision. Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) for example find a 
negative relationship between regional employment density, as well as industrial specialization, 
and employer-provided training in the UK. Similarly, Brunello and De Paola (2008) and Andini 
et al. (2013) detect a negative relationship between regional employment density and firm-
sponsored training in Italy. Most closely related to our study, Mühlemann and Wolter (2011) 
find for Switzerland that the density of firms in the same region and industry is negatively 
related to firms’ apprenticeship training activity. These studies mainly attribute lower training 
to poaching. 
We aim at testing the hypothesis that poaching indeed is the main mechanism behind the neg-
ative correlation between regional employer competition and training. We use data on appren-
tice training completers and their transition to skilled employment in Germany. To identify 
poaching, we apply an approach developed by Mohrenweiser, Zwick, and Backes-Gellner 
(2013). However, they do not consider poaching in the context of regional competition. 
Our three main contributions are the following. First, in line with the literature cited above, we 
find that establishments in highly competitive regions train fewer apprentices. Second, we find 
that establishments in highly competitive regions are significantly more likely to become vic-
tims of poaching. Similar to Mohrenweiser et al. (2013), we however show that poaching inci-
dence is small and not systematic. In addition, firms do not reduce their training activity in 
response to poaching. Therefore, poaching - as observed ex-post at the establishment level - 
cannot explain the negative impact of regional labor market competition on training activity. 
As a consequence, our third contribution is to propose alternative explanations. We find that 
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availability and quality of all apprenticeship completers who leave their training firm (including 
non-poached movers) are higher in more competitive as compared to less competitive regions. 
In addition, it is costlier to train apprentices in competitive regions. Besides the better supply 
of attractive apprenticeship completers, their hiring and wage costs are relatively low in ag-
glomerations. These differences between labor market regions prevail for all apprenticeship 
completers, they have been rarely discussed in the literature before but seem to have a much 
more pervasive impact than differences in the tiny group of poached apprenticeship completers.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce crucial theoretical concepts 
of poaching and present the institutional setting of apprenticeship training in Germany, which 
we exploit to apply these concepts. In section 3, we review previous empirical evidence on 
regional labor market competition, firms’ training provision, and the sparse evidence on poach-
ing. Section 4 presents our data base, sampling design, and the identification of poaching. Sec-
tion 5 analyzes apprenticeship completers’ wages with regard to their mobility and regional 
demand-side competition. Section 6 presents econometric specifications and estimation results 
of the correlation between regional labor market competition, apprenticeship training, and 
poaching. Section 7 discusses the implications of our empirical findings for the labor market 
more generally, and provides alternative explanations of the regional training patterns. Section 
8 concludes. 
2. Theoretical and institutional background 
2.1 Apprentice training, imperfect competition, and poaching 
We regard it as poaching when worker mobility between firms is a consequence of an active 
attraction by the hiring firm (“raider”) and against the will of the sending firm (“victim”), a 
concept underlying, e.g., the theoretical work of Combes and Duranton (2006). Poaching is 
obviously problematic with regard to workers who have recently received training sponsored 
by their employer. Our focus is therefore on workers in Germany who just completed an ap-
prenticeship. For these workers, training firms have devoted time and money, usually incurring 
net costs during the training period (Soskice, 1994; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; Dionisius 
et al., 2009). These training investments only pay off in the longer run if the apprenticeship 
completer stays with the training firm for some time (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).  
We consider as potential cases of poaching only job moves immediately after apprenticeship 
completion, or in other words, job moves that occur before the firm’s training investments can 
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pay off. In addition, we want to make sure that the termination of the employment relationship 
directly after the apprenticeship training period is involuntary from the perspective of the train-
ing firm. Therefore, we concentrate on those apprenticeship completers with the highest produc-
tivity during apprenticeship training who in addition earn more at the new employer than their 
peers at the training firm (Mohrenweiser et al., 2013). Such an event is obviously undesirable 
to the training firm, and a rational training firm should want to avoid it. We seek to ensure that 
observed poaching events reflect free-riding on another firm’s training investment, by only con-
sidering mobility within occupations. Thereby, we exploit one of the central features of the 
German apprenticeship system, the transferability of occupation-specific training contents be-
tween firms. We briefly present crucial features of the German apprenticeship system before 
we turn to the possibility and observability of poaching. 
The “dual” apprenticeship system is the main source of occupational qualification in Germany. 
As of 2014, half of the German working-age population held a vocational degree – usually 
acquired through an apprenticeship – as their highest qualification.1 The German apprenticeship 
system makes poaching perfectly viable for a number of reasons. One reason why training firms 
can hardly prevent poaching is that they cannot force trained workers to stay for some time after 
training completion. It is therefore highly unlikely that non-compete covenants are made and 
enforced for apprenticeship completers.2 Furthermore, there are no legal restrictions to make 
job offers to apprenticeship completers and to the wages offered to them. Apprenticeship com-
pleters also do not have to reimburse training costs if they switch the employer directly after 
training. It is also helpful for potential rival employers that all apprenticeships in one region 
and occupation end on the same day (the date of the final exam held in the chambers of industry 
and commerce or chambers of crafts). In addition, it is known to establishments which other 
establishments in the region train apprentices and in which occupation. Thus, a rival firm can 
easily outbid a training firm by offering a higher wage for a trained worker.  
Another important aspect for the viability of poaching is that training contents are transferable 
and apprenticeship completers can signal their acquired skills to other firms. Apprenticeships 
are strongly regulated by the Vocational Training Act and the occupation-specific training cur-
ricula. The Vocational Training Act specifies the duration of training, necessary equipment and 
staff in charge of training, and other requirements for training firms. Training curricula are 
                                                          
1 Federal Statistical Office (2015). 
2 Starr (2015) reports differences in non-compete covenants between US states and occupations. He uses these 
differences to empirically show a positive correlation between the strength of non-compete enforcement and 
training intensity mainly in high education and high earnings occupations. 
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published, tailor-made for each occupation, and describe minimum standards which have to be 
met for a successful training completion. Apprenticeships are essentially employment contracts 
combining on-the-job training with actual productive work. One to two days per week are spent 
on theoretical contents in public vocational schools. These contents are necessarily general hu-
man capital. The chambers additionally monitor the quality of practical training provided in 
each training establishment in their region, notably by intermediate exams taking place halfway 
through the apprenticeship. Therefore training contents can be characterised to a large extent as 
general human capital within the occupational domain (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). Appren-
ticeship completers in addition receive certificates from independent bodies that also grade the 
final examinations (vocational schools and chambers) that signal a minimum skill level (Ace-
moglu and Pischke, 2000). Certificates therefore signal the individual quality relative to those 
apprenticeship completers trained in the same occupation (Mohrenweiser, Wydra-Sommaggio, 
and Zwick, 2015). Considering all these institutional features, it is easily possible to identify 
apprenticeship completers in all training firms who are worth poaching, with a high degree of 
certainty about individual quality.  
Poaching can be profitable for the raider since the training has increased the worker’s produc-
tivity, but the raiding firm has not contributed to the costs of training – it free-rides on the 
training firm’s investment. Furthermore, to the extent that a raider can observe a worker’s 
productivity relative to other workers at the training firm, it also free-rides on the revelation of 
apprentices’ individual productivity during the training period. The raider thus extracts a rent 
from the training firm and also weakens a potential competitor in the product market if it can 
attract a highly productive apprenticeship completer for a wage not higher than his or her 
productivity. Therefore, raiding can be a profit-maximizing strategy. Poaching however re-
quires raiders to compete with training firms for their apprenticeship completers. Therefore, 
poaching is only successful if the raider is strong enough to counter the monopsony power of 
the training firm. This monopsony power mainly stems from three sources.  
The first source of training firms’ monopsony power is their information advantage regarding 
apprenticeship completers’ quality (Chang and Wang, 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). 
This information advantage implies that apprentices who are not retained by the training firm 
are an adverse selection (Greenwald, 1986). Empirical evidence of such adverse selection is 
provided by Mohrenweiser et al. (2015). They attribute the negative selection of moving ap-
prenticeship completers to training establishments’ information advantages on soft skills. They 
also argue however that learning about hard skills is symmetric for training employers and their 
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potential rivals because these skills are visible from the graded final exams. Even though mov-
ers are negatively selected on average, however, a rival firm may offer a higher wage to attract 
particularly well-performing apprenticeship completers.   
The second source of monopsony is the costliness of regional mobility. Mobility costs give 
local employers market power over workers, compared to more distant employers (Manning, 
2011; Benson, 2013). Note that apprenticeship completers are immobile in comparison to 
higher educated and older employees. This emphasizes the importance of spatial monopsony 
(Harhoff and Kane, 1997). Thus, the level of competition for a firm’s apprenticeship completers 
crucially depends on the number of other employment opportunities within a certain region.  
The third source of monopsony power is losses incurred by a change of occupation. The main 
reason for this third source of monopsony power is that occupations are an important dimension 
of human capital specificity (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010). Manning 
(2003) emphasizes the importance of occupational boundaries in generating monopsony power. 
In Germany, the labor market for skilled employees – and for apprenticeship completers in 
particular – is mainly defined along occupational demarcation lines (Deißinger, 2008). As a 
consequence, occupation changes are associated with worse wage outcomes than employer 
changes within an occupation (Göggel and Zwick, 2012; Fitzenberger et al., 2015). Failing to 
account for the importance of occupations thus leads to mismeasurement of competition for 
apprenticeship completers. We therefore only consider apprenticeship completers who do not 
switch their occupation and define regional competition on the basis of occupational labor mar-
kets as in Benson (2013).  
2.2 Poaching as a regional externality 
Poaching has received scholarly attention particularly in regional economic theory. Combes 
and Duranton (2006) for example develop a model to grasp the trade-off between the benefits 
of locating close to other firms (input sharing, labor pooling, knowledge spillovers) and its 
detriments (poaching and higher wages to prevent it). The main assumptions and implications 
of their model can be summarized as follows: First, co-location of firms is a necessary condition 
for poaching, since worker mobility is spatially bounded. Second, firms co-locate nevertheless 
if the benefits of co-location outweigh its costs. Several theoretical papers thus discuss firm 
location in the face of a poaching threat. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) suggest that immobile 
workers are more likely to invest in industry-specific human capital if there is competition be-
tween regional employers – a regional monopsony could exploit workers’ mobility constraints 
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by paying wages below their marginal product. As a consequence, firms which depend on the 
supply of industry-specific skills have to face a certain amount of competition. However, the 
model explicitly rules out firm-sponsored training. Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2005) and 
Almazan et al. (2007) propose models in which firms choose a location depending on the fi-
nancing of their employees’ training, with isolation being the preferable choice if the firms bear 
a high share of the training costs. These theoretical approaches all point towards a negative 
relationship between local competition and firm-sponsored training activity, such as apprentice 
training.  
Yet, there is little empirical evidence on whether training firms actually choose isolated loca-
tions (thus forgoing positive agglomeration externalities) if they are vulnerable to trained-
worker poaching. In our analysis, we also cannot control whether the fear of poaching influ-
ences the complex location decision of firms. However, as Mühlemann and Wolter (2011) ar-
gue, firms are not likely to choose their location based on their training activities because the 
average training establishment spends just about one percent of its skilled-worker wage bill on 
apprentice training. Apprentice training, while important, is not the core business of any firm, 
and should therefore be a minor factor in firms’ location choices. If anything, training estab-
lishments may adjust their training activity downwards in anticipation of a competition-induced 
poaching threat. However, the available measures of competition (typically, the number of other 
employers in the same region and industry or occupation) do not vary much over time, so an-
ticipation effects should play a minor role. Therefore, we take firms’ location as given and 
regard it as unlikely that reverse causality is an important problem for our analysis.  
Related evidence on the positive correlation between agglomeration and labor market compe-
tition is provided by Hirsch, Jahn, and Oberfichtner (2016) for German regions. Their study 
approaches employer competition via an analysis of the urban wage premium and its sources. 
They show that the urban wage premium is to a large extent due to tougher employer competi-
tion in dense labor markets. The results of Hirsch et al. (2016) have important implications for 
our analysis. In particular, they point to the importance of employer competition for individual 
labor market outcomes, notably wages: Firms in dense regions need to offer higher wages in 
order to attract workers, which may offset the greater ease with which they can find suitable 
workers. Firms may also need to use aggressive hiring strategies, such as poaching. These find-
ings suggest that indeed, regional competition may increase the incidence of poaching. How-
ever, there is little empirical evidence to support this claim, with the exception of studies on the 
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link between regional competition and firms’ training provision. We review these studies in the 
next section.  
3. Previous empirical evidence on regional labor market competition and poaching 
The empirical analysis of poaching and firm-sponsored training is largely rooted in the literature 
on agglomeration effects that arise from economies of scale and spatial concentration of work-
ers and firms (Marshall, 1890). This literature emphasizes worker mobility as an important 
channel of agglomeration externalities (labor pooling and knowledge spillovers). For a more 
recent theoretical discussion of these channels, see Duranton and Puga (2004). Empirical evi-
dence on the positive effect of regional labor market density on labor turnover is provided by 
Andersson and Thulin (2013), who find this effect to be even stronger for more highly qualified 
workers. Similar results are obtained by Mühlemann, Ryan, and Wolter (2013) and Hirsch, 
Jahn, and Oberfichtner (2016), who also find that wages are higher in denser (and hence more 
competitive) regions, in order to limit the turnover of skilled employees. Moreover, there is 
ample evidence that worker mobility in dense regional labor markets is concentrated within 
industries and occupations (Bleakley and Lin, 2012; Andini et al., 2013), that is, dense regional 
labor markets allow for a better skill match between workers and firms (as predicted by theories 
of agglomeration advantages). Against this background, and because within-industry and 
within-occupation mobility allows for a better transfer of skills and knowledge acquired on the 
job, employers in dense regional labor markets are expected to be particularly reluctant to pro-
vide training to their workers. Empirical studies indeed find a negative relationship between 
regional competition and firm-sponsored training (Brunello and Gambarotto, 2007; Brunello 
and De Paola, 2008; Mühlemann and Wolter, 2011; Andini et al., 2013). 
An early empirical study on Germany, closely related to ours, was conducted by Harhoff and 
Kane (1997). Motivated by the stark contrast between German-style apprentice training and the 
absence of such a training system in the US, Harhoff and Kane (1997) identify the relatively 
low levels of regional mobility in Germany as a factor which favors training. They argue that 
workers’ limited spatial scope of job search gives training firms monopsony power over their 
trained workers. If worker mobility across regions is low, one can use regional variation in the 
number of potential employers to investigate the effect of regional employer competition on 
firms’ training provision and recruiting behavior. Accordingly, Harhoff and Kane (1997) stress 
that regional firm and employment densities are significantly negatively related to firms’ train-
ing participation and the share of apprentices trained. 
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The link between regional labor market competition and firm-sponsored training has been in-
vestigated also for other European countries and the US. Using data from the UK on employer-
provided training, Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) study the relationship between individual 
workers’ training participation and regional labor market competition.3 Brunello and Gamba-
rotto (2007) find a negative effect of regional employment density, measured at the NUTS 2 
level (groups of counties), and industrial specialization on workers’ participation in and the 
duration of firm-sponsored training. The negative effect of employment density on training as 
such is very robust, and its interaction with average regional firm size has a positive effect on 
training. This suggests that the threat of poaching more severely decreases firms’ training pro-
vision in regions characterized by smaller firms, i.e. regions where competition can be expected 
to be stronger. Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) do not identify poaching directly, but they show 
that regional density has a positive impact on voluntary job mobility, even more so for workers 
who have recently received training. Since part of the overall amount of voluntary job mobility 
could be instances of poaching, Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) argue that trained workers are 
more likely to get poached by other firms as regional employment density increases. 
In a related firm-level study, Brunello and De Paola (2008) derive from a search and matching 
model that regional employment density could be negatively correlated with employer-spon-
sored training. Using Italian data and measuring employment density at the NUTS 3 region 
level, they show that the (assumed) negative poaching externalities dominate potential positive 
(complementary) agglomeration effects on training. That is, it is assumed that agglomeration 
(employment density) is a source of both positive and negative externalities. Brunello and De 
Paola (2008) address endogeneity concerns by instrumenting regional employment density with 
historical lags (from the late 19th and early 20th century), suggesting that their findings repre-
sent a causal relationship. Similar to Brunello and Gambarotto (2007), the negative training 
effect of employment density is found to be driven by small firms and not for firms which are 
part of “industrial districts,” supposedly because such districts are founded on co-operative re-
lationships between employers, which poaching would undermine. Benson (2013) stresses that 
US hospitals subsidize nursing schools in their region. These schools provide general training 
for all trainees who remain active in the nursing occupation. His argument is that low regional 
mobility of nurses and few attractive occupational options outside nursing provides hospitals 
                                                          
3 An important difference between the study by Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) and our study is that any kind of 
employer-provided training is considered, including continued vocational training. Compared to German-style 
apprentice training, therefore, their data may contain a large share of relatively firm-specific training, which 
should be less susceptible to poaching. 
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with sufficient monopsony power to invest in general training. An important result of the study 
is that the incentive for subsidies increases with the market share hospitals have in the occupa-
tional labor market for nurses. 
The delineation of regions used to measure competition in the above-cited studies (administra-
tive territorial units) may not capture competition very accurately, since commuting flows may 
reach across administrative borders. A functional definition of labor market regions based on 
commuting flows is thus better suited to capture competition faced by a firm in a given location 
(Kosfeld and Werner, 2012). Therefore, Mühlemann and Wolter (2011), who also analyze 
firms’ training activity with regard to regional competition, apply a definition of regional labor 
markets based on travel time. Their study is a close reference to our analysis because it uses 
data on apprenticeship training in Switzerland. The Swiss apprenticeship system is very similar 
to Germany’s, regarding the importance of on-the-job training, generality of contents, and 
standardization of final exams. Mühlemann and Wolter (2011) find that the regional density of 
firms in the same industry is negatively related to firms’ training provision. This pattern is ro-
bust, inter alia, to the inclusion of region fixed effects. The negative effect of density is found 
to be driven primarily by firms abstaining from training altogether, rather than training fewer 
apprentices. Mühlemann and Wolter (2011) also show that the observed negative training ef-
fects apply only to firms which bear net costs of training. This means that regional competition 
is relevant only to training firms who would lose their training investment when being poached. 
This finding supports the interpretation that firms’ lower training efforts reflect fear of poach-
ing. 
Finally, using Swiss data, Mühlemann, Ryan, and Wolter (2013) find that the number of estab-
lishments in a regional industry increases apprentices’ (and skilled workers’) pay relative to 
unskilled workers and their turnover rate relative to the national average of workers in the same 
occupation. The relative-wage effect of competition reflects firms’ monopsony power over ap-
prentices: When there are fewer local competitors, there is less need to provide a wage incentive 
to one’s own apprentices and skilled workers to stay with the firm. The positive effect of local 
employer competition on skilled-worker and trainee turnover therefore might be due to a higher 
incidence of poaching in more competitive regions. 
Overall, thus, related studies find a positive effect of regional competition on trained workers’ 
wages and turnover rates, and a negative effect on firms’ training provision. The authors usually 
attribute the latter effect to a higher poaching risk. Despite the substantial body of evidence on 
the regional determinants of training activity, direct evidence on regional competition and 
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poaching is scarce, however. We can contribute to this literature in several ways. The above-
cited studies take it as given that competition affects firms’ training decisions through the 
poaching risk, but none of them identifies poaching empirically. Applying the identification 
strategy for poaching proposed by Mohrenweiser et al. (2013), we investigate the relationship 
between employer competition and poaching directly and analyze the consequences of poach-
ing for training efforts. We use occupational labor markets as indicator of regional competition 
instead of regional industries. Occupational barriers are particularly important for apprentice-
ship completers because their training is almost perfectly transferable across firms if they stay 
in the occupation. We accordingly only include apprenticeship completers who do not change 
their occupation. Firms are usually assigned unambiguously to one industry, but especially large 
firms may demand labor across a broad range of occupations, some of which are likely relevant 
also to other industries.4 Therefore, a purely industry-based identification of potential compet-
itors neglects occupations that are less typical for one’s own industry, and also neglects relevant 
competition from other industries. Besides the poaching analysis, we also look at differences 
between regional labor markets with respect to decisive drivers for apprenticeship training such 
as the availability and quality of employer movers and their costs in comparison to the costs of 
own training. In the next section, we present the data and empirical study design used in our 
empirical analysis.  
4. Data 
4.1 Data sources and sampling 
The data bases we use are the Institute for Employment Research’s (IAB) Employee History 
Panel (Beschäftigtenhistorik; BeH) and Establishment History Panel (BHP). The BeH and the 
BHP are generated from public employment records, administered by the Federal Employment 
Agency (BA), which serve as the basis for social security contributions. Besides the exact be-
ginning and end dates of employment spells, these data include gross daily wages,5 workers’ 
level of qualification and occupation, their employers’ industry and location at the NUTS 3 
level (Kreise or districts), and a host of other variables. Since misreporting of data is subject to 
pecuniary sanctions, these data are highly reliable. Moreover, the BeH cover the universe of 
                                                          
4 Some of the most frequent training occupations in our sample are used in many industries, for instance clerical 
workers (18% of apprenticeship completers), electricians (12%), and locksmiths (11%). 
5 Wages are censored at the top. However, the censoring threshold is the social security contribution limit, and 
therefore censoring does not affect apprentices’ wages (which are usually less than half the wage of a qualified 
full-time worker). 
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employment subject to social security in Germany, which excludes only civil servants and the 
self-employed. The BeH thus contain some 80 percent of all employees in Germany, and 100 
percent of apprentices in the “dual” apprenticeship system, because they are employees subject 
to social security contribution at their training establishments.6 
We sample establishments and apprentices as follows. We choose all establishments which 
were surveyed in the IAB Establishment Panel between 2003 and 2011.7 This panel covers all 
industries except public authorities and not-for-profit establishments. We drop the public sector, 
non-profit establishments, as well as the agricultural sector, resulting in a sample of profit-
oriented business establishments. Administrative employment data at the establishment level 
are taken from the BHP, a yearly panel resulting from an aggregation of the employment records 
of the BeH. These data contain all establishments in Germany with at least one employee sub-
ject to social security contribution, measured at June 30th of that year. At the individual level, 
we sample all employment spells from the BeH of all persons who were employed as appren-
tices at any of the sample establishments at some point in time between 1999 and 2010 (1.25 
million persons). We follow these persons over time, focusing on their transition from appren-
ticeship to regular (skilled) employment. To sort out the apprenticeship completers for whom 
we can potentially observe poaching, we apply the following criteria to the sampled employ-
ment spells: 
First, we consider only apprenticeships that took between 700 and 1,500 days. Shorter appren-
ticeship periods probably indicate drop-outs, longer durations may include exam repeaters be-
cause most apprenticeships take at most 3.5 years. We omit these individuals so as to obtain 
homogenous groups of apprentices and be able to assess their relative individual quality. We 
allow for some time of employment interruption, e.g. for sickness leave during the apprentice-
ship period. We also require that apprenticeships start between June and December, and end 
between January and August, since the hiring and final exam periods usually fall into these 
months, respectively. 
Second, since wages are an important variable for our identification of poaching, we remove 
extreme wage outliers, defined as apprentices who earn more than twice or less than half the 
average wage in their two-digit occupation and apprenticeship completion year. 
                                                          
6 See Vom Berge et al. (2013) for further information on the BeH. 
7 The IAB Establishment Panel is a large establishment survey from which we can merge additional information 
not contained in the administrative data. 
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Third, since we want to identify poaching of successful apprenticeship completers,8 we need to 
identify a transition from apprenticeship to regular employment. To be more specific, we only 
include apprentices who become employed in a full-time job as their first employment after 
completing apprenticeship training. We ensure that the job is not an internship or otherwise 
non-regular kind of employment. 
Fourth, we construct so-called “cells” that contain all successful apprenticeship completers 
within one establishment, two-digit occupation, and completion year, and keep only cells with 
at least two apprentices. The reason for this sample restriction is that we need to compare indi-
vidual apprentices to a peer who potentially moves to another firm to identify poaching.9 
Fifth, we drop cells in which all apprenticeship completers leave their training establishment 
because we need the comparison group of retained apprenticeship completers. 
Sixth, we keep only apprentices whose transition to regular employment occurs within ten days 
after the observed end of their apprenticeship, and who stay within the same two-digit occupa-
tion. These restrictions ensure that training establishments are not able to get a return on training 
investments by employing the apprenticeship completer at a low wage for some more weeks or 
months after training completion. 
Finally, there are some obvious outliers for the first wage as a fully qualified worker after ap-
prenticeship training. We therefore drop apprenticeship completers for whom a gross daily 
wage below 10 or above 500 Euros is reported.  
Applying all of these conditions results in a restricted sample composed of apprenticeship com-
pleters of rather large training establishments, which might not be representative of the popu-
lation of apprenticeship completers and training establishments. To check whether our results 
may be driven by these sample restrictions, we construct a broader so-called “baseline” sample 
of apprenticeship completers, their training establishments, and the destination establishments 
of moving apprenticeship completers. This baseline sample is drawn analogously to the poach-
ing sample with the exception that some of the strict conditions we have to impose to identify 
                                                          
8 We cannot identify apprenticeship completion directly, but our restrictions regarding apprenticeship duration and 
transition to regular employment allows us to identify completion very plausibly. 
9 We have to ensure that changes of the establishment identifier number reflect true changes of employer. This is 
potentially problematic with the data at hand because the establishment identifier does not always correspond to 
a single autonomous establishment, but may instead identify a plant, store, office, or other kind of branch be-
longing to the same company, and being located in the same district. We address these issues in several ways, 
as discussed in the subsection “Spurious worker mobility” in Appendix B. 
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poaching are suspended (see an overview of the sample generation steps in Table B1 in Appen-
dix B). 
4.2 Identification of poaching  
We proceed to identify poaching of apprenticeship completers. To be counted as poaching, a 
job move by an apprenticeship completer should satisfy two conditions: First, the move should 
be undesirable and unintended from the training firm’s perspective. Second, the move should 
be accompanied by an active effort on the part of the hiring firm, that is, there should be an 
incentive set by the hiring firm to attract the apprenticeship completer. As argued by Mohren-
weiser et al. (2013), it is plausible to assume that the most desirable apprenticeship completers 
receive the highest wages within their peer group (the “cell” defined by the same establishment, 
training occupation, and completion year) during their last apprenticeship spell. Therefore, we 
can interpret an apprenticeship completer’s relative wage at the end of the apprenticeship as a 
signal of the training employer’s intention to retain him or her as a skilled employee. Further-
more, we can use apprenticeship completers’ skilled entry wages to infer which job moves were 
likely triggered by an attractive wage offer from an external hiring firm. We take these ideas to 
the data as follows. Within each cell, we compare wages between those who stay with the train-
ing establishment and those who move to another employer. If a mover’s wage at the end of the 
apprenticeship is higher than that of the best-paid stayer in the same cell, the mover satisfies 
our first poaching condition (P1): The training firm would have liked to keep him or her, con-
sidering that it does keep one or more comparable apprentices who earned less at the end of the 
apprenticeship.10  
An important precondition for the validity of our first poaching condition is that wages vary 
across apprentices within a training establishment/completion year/training occupation cell, and 
that this variation is not spurious. In fact, there is substantial variance in training wages within 
cells, and it increases markedly towards the end of an apprenticeship, see Figure 1.11 Employers 
therefore increasingly differentiate apprentice pay as the final exam approaches. We take the 
wage variance as evidence that employers signal desirability to their best apprentices by paying 
them relatively high wages and incentivizing them to stay after training completion. Con-
versely, it seems rational to pay lower wages to less desirable apprentices, in order to limit the 
                                                          
10 Note that the first poaching condition does not rule out the possibility that the establishment has intended from 
the beginning to retain only a fraction of its apprentices. In this case, training establishments are most likely to 
get rid of the apprenticeship completers at the bottom of the within-cell wage distribution (see the descriptive 
analysis for evidence that movers’ wage positions are significantly worse than stayers’). 
11 A typical three-year training period lasts from September, year t, until June/July, year t+3.  
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sunk costs of training. Further evidence motivating the use of the wage position within the cell 
as an indicator of apprentices’ desirability is presented in Mohrenweiser et al. (2013), Appendix 
A. In particular, wage positions in the final apprenticeship year have been found to correlate 
with external productivity indicators such as exam grades (Mohrenweiser et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 1: Development of training wages and their variance within a cell during apprenticeship train-
ing 
Our second condition for poaching (P2) is that, after having moved to another employer for his 
or her first skilled job, an apprenticeship completer receives a higher wage than any of his or 
her peers who stayed at the training establishment. We consider the highest wage of a stayer 
within a cell as the training establishment’s revealed maximum willingness (or ability) to pay. 
If a mover receives a wage higher than this benchmark, we interpret this as a bidding competi-
tion between the training and hiring establishments which the latter has won.12  
In combination, the two poaching conditions imply that an apprenticeship completer whom the 
training establishment would have liked to keep moves to another employer that offers a wage 
the training firm is unwilling or unable to counter. We refer to training establishments which 
lose at least one apprenticeship completer due to poaching as “victims,” the remaining training 
establishments that are not poaching victims are referred to as “controls.” Analogously, with 
respect to the external hiring establishments, we refer to the destinations of poached appren-
                                                          
12 The hirer probably incurs a winner’s curse, because the training establishment has an information advantage 
concerning the apprentice’s productivity and might not be willing to retain the apprenticeship completer at the 
wage offered by the hirer. 
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ticeship completers as “raiders,” and to all other destinations of moving apprenticeship com-
pleters from the victims and controls employers as “other hirers.” Figure 2 provides an overview 
of the training and hiring establishment samples and the apprenticeship completer movements 
between establishments.13 In the baseline sample, we distinguish training and hiring establish-
ments, but not victims and controls, respectively raiders and other hirers.  
 
Figure 2: Employee flows between establishments in the training and hiring sample 
In both, the “poaching” and the baseline sample, we drop extreme outliers in terms of their 
apprentice share in total employment, i.e. observations above the 99th percentile. These obser-
vations might be parts of a firm that are devoted exclusively to apprentice training (training 
facilities). Furthermore, we delete the top percentile in terms of employment growth, because 
these firms might pursue exceptionally aggressive hiring strategies and bias the incidence of 
poaching upwards. 
4.3 Samples and descriptive statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the two samples used in the analysis. Our poaching sample comprises 
21,416 training establishments with 134,602 apprenticeship completers. Some eight percent of 
apprenticeship completers leave their training establishment within ten days after training com-
pletion to start working for one of 5,811 external hiring establishments. The larger baseline 
sample necessarily yields a higher share of immediate movers, at 11.4 percent. Otherwise, the 
                                                          
13 By definition, an establishment cannot be a poaching victim and a control establishment at the same time, but it 
can be a poaching victim in one year and a control establishment in another. The same rule applies to raiders 
and other hirers. 
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characteristics of apprenticeship completers do not differ substantially between the two sam-
ples, as reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. In the poaching sample, 0.6 percent of appren-
ticeship completers (eight percent of all movers) are poached. Both poaching conditions (P1 
and P2) contribute to similar amounts to poaching, as shown by the percentage of movers ful-
filling either of the two conditions; the measured poaching incidence is thus not driven primar-
ily by one of the two conditions. The share of “raiders” in all external hiring establishments is 
about eleven percent, similar to the share of poached individuals of eight percent. Tables A2 
and A3 in the Appendix provide summary statistics at the establishment level for the poaching 
and baseline samples, respectively. 
Poaching sample N n Share of  
Total (N) 
Share of  
Total (n) 
Apprenticeship completers (Total) 134,602 134,581     
 - Stayers 124,475 124,458 0.925 0.925 
 - Movers 10,127 10,127 0.075 0.075 
 - Poached movers 855 855 0.006 0.006 
 - Movers satisfying P1 2,643 2,643 0.02 0.02 
 - Movers satisfying P2 2,363 2,363 0.018 0.018 
Training establishments (Total) 21,416 4,639     
 - Victims 559 409 0.026 0.088 
 - Controls 20,857 4,230 0.974 0.912 
External hiring establishments (Total) 5,811 3,519     
 - Raiders 623 516 0.107 0.147 
 - Other hirers 5,188 3,003 0.893 0.853 
All establishments 27,039 7,926     
Baseline sample         
Apprenticeship completers (Total) 196,697 196,066     
 - Stayers 174,282 173,814 0.886 0.887 
 - Movers 22,415 22,396 0.114 0.114 
Training establishments 58,632 21,033     
External hiring establishments 14,723 10,624   
All establishments 72,402 30,084     
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. N is the number of observations and n is the number of unique individ-
uals or establishments. Sum of n(stayers) and n(movers) may exceed n(completers) because of multi-
ply observed completers who both stay and move. Sums of training and hiring establishments may ex-
ceed number of all establishments because of overlap. 
Our central empirical question is whether apprenticeship completers’ employer moves, includ-
ing poaching, are related to regional labor market competition. Figure A1 in the Appendix 
shows the geographical pattern of the mover share – the inverse of the retention rate – for the 
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141 German labor market regions.14 The map suggests that overall, larger, more agglomerated 
labor market regions (e.g. the areas around Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt) tend to 
have higher shares of movers among all apprenticeship completers, but the relationship between 
agglomeration and turnover is not very pronounced. Figure A2 displays the share of poached 
movers in all apprenticeship completers. This variable does not seem to correlate with agglom-
eration. However, agglomeration is not synonymous for competition, and so this merely de-
scriptive look might not capture the potential correlation of poaching with regional competition. 
Furthermore, our poaching identification is based on relative earnings of apprenticeship com-
pleters and wage differences between those who stay with the training firm and those who move 
to another employer. Previous studies indicate that besides employer mobility, also earnings of 
trained workers are affected by regional labor market competition (Mühlemann et al., 2013). 
We therefore proceed to a deeper analysis of apprenticeship completers’ wages and their job 
mobility and their correlation with regional competition before we present our poaching analy-
sis. 
5. Regional wage analysis 
Analogously to previous studies (Fitzenberger et al., 2015; Mohrenweiser et al., 2015), we ex-
pect to find that non-retained apprenticeship completers (movers) earn lower wages than those 
who are retained by their training establishment, reflecting an adverse selection of movers on 
average. Besides training wages,15 we also consider apprenticeship completers’ relative wages, 
that is, their deviation from the mean of the cell (training establishment, training occupation, 
and cohort). By referring to peers in the same cell, the relative wage is a direct measure of 
individual relative productivity or quality from the viewpoint of the training firm. We argue 
that the relative productivity of an apprenticeship completer is a good indicator of the attrac-
tiveness of the trained employee to be retained by the training firm. 
We report results from regressions of these wage measures on a dummy for movers and occu-
pation fixed effects in Table 2. We cluster standard errors at the level of regional occupational 
labor markets because the relevant labor markets for apprentices are bounded spatially and by 
occupations. Since we do not need the poaching variable in this step of the analysis, we report 
                                                          
14 Note that our sample contains at least 12 apprenticeship completers and at least 5 training establishments for 
every labor market regions, and roughly 2,000 completers and 300 establishments on the region average. Thus, 
the sample can be considered fairly representative at the regional level. 
15 Unless otherwise specified, “training wages” refers to wages during the last spell of an apprenticeship, i.e. at 
training completion. 
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results using the broader baseline sample in the main text and results based on the poaching 
sample in the Appendix. The results suggest a significantly negative correlation between mov-
ing (not being retained) and both the absolute training wage and the within-cell wage position. 
For the absolute wage (columns 1-3), adding basic controls (establishment size, regional em-
ployment density) does not affect the estimate, which implies that movers’ training wages are 
some two percent lower than stayers’ on average. The relative wage (column 4) is already 
cleared of confounding factors at the establishment and other higher levels, and apprentices 
within cells are virtually identical with respect to age, education, and any other individual-level 
characteristics. This explains the extremely low explanatory power of the regression.16  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log training 
wage 
log training 
wage 
log training 
wage 
Training wage 
rel. to cell 
mean 
Mover -0.0241*** -0.0183*** -0.0213*** -0.228*** 
 (-3.85) (-2.98) (-3.46) (-3.14) 
     
log full-time em-
ployment, estab. 
 0.0507*** 0.0466***  
 (22.35) (19.70)  
     
log empl. density, 
region 
  0.0331***  
  (6.66)  
     
Constant 3.279*** 3.123*** 2.983*** 7.53e-08 
 (42.88) (43.24) (40.55) (.) 
Observations 196697 196500 196500 196697 
R2 0.251 0.331 0.338 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.330 0.338 -0.000 
Table 2: Wage statistics of movers compared to stayers, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. All 
estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level 
(labor market regions, 2-digit occupations). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
We obtain similar results for the narrower poaching sample, see Appendix Table A4. Our find-
ings thus suggest that movers are adversely selected on average. These findings suggest that 
training establishments succeed in retaining their best apprenticeship completers. However, the 
findings may also indicate that training establishments’ monopsony power is limited: They need 
to pay competitive wages to incentivize their more productive completers to stay, resulting in 
high average wages for stayers. Furthermore, movers may incur a wage penalty due to statistical 
discrimination, as they are negatively selected on average (Schönberg, 2007). In combination, 
                                                          
16 The relative wage is not transformed into logs because its mean and median are obviously close to zero. 
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both factors imply that stayers can demand higher wages than movers also after transition into 
a skilled job.17 
The findings above imply that apprenticeship completers’ wages reflect competition in the labor 
market, an important precondition for the validity of our identification of poaching. We can test 
this implication more explicitly by investigating the relationship between wages and regional 
competition. We measure regional competition as the log density (number per square kilometer) 
of establishments in the regional occupational labor market, that is, establishments within the 
same labor market region with at least one employee in relevant occupations.18 We leave aside 
the individual wage position, which is informative only with regard to heterogeneity within 
training cells (i.e. heterogeneity at the individual level). Instead, we consider the standard de-
viation (SD) of training wages at the cell level, as an indicator of wage differentiation within 
training establishments.19 Additionally, we compute the difference between skilled wage (the 
wage earned directly after transition into skilled employment) and training wage. This differ-
ence can be interpreted as the quality-adjusted wage of an apprenticeship completer and there-
fore as a proxy of his or her effective wage costs. This assumes that training wages contain 
information on the value of the apprentice from several sources. First, large and prestigious 
training firms may pay more for all apprentices. Second, in occupations and during phases of 
the business cycle in which it is difficult to attract good apprentices, training firms might offer 
a bonus to the collective bargaining training wage, and finally we have seen above that training 
firms differentiate between apprentices in the same cohort and occupation according to their 
relative quality. 
Results from bivariate regressions are presented in Table 3. Training wages and their standard 
deviation within cells (establishment, occupation, cohort) are higher in highly competitive re-
gions. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that training wages are used by training 
firms as signals for their intention to retain apprentices (Mühlemann, Ryan, and Wolter, 
                                                          
17 We do not report skilled-wage comparisons between stayers and movers because movers’ destination establish-
ments differ systematically from the training establishments (notably, the latter are much larger, due to require-
ments of the poaching identification). We found that controlling for establishment size and other available vari-
ables is insufficient to reduce the implied bias to an acceptable level. 
18 More precisely, regional competition is measured for training establishments on the basis of all training occu-
pations, and for hiring establishments, on the basis of all observed hiring occupations (we do not observe all 
external apprenticeship completer hirings for these establishments). Each occupation is weighted by its share in 
all trained (respectively observed hired) apprenticeship completers. Due to the definition of labor market regions, 
which are relatively homogenous in geographic size, it is virtually irrelevant whether we measure competition 
as the number or the density of regional competitors. 
19 Training wages (and their SD) are regressed on the competition faced by the training establishment; first-job 
wages and the wage difference between first job and training are regressed on the competition faced by the hiring 
establishment (which may be different from the training establishment).  
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2013).20 Furthermore, training establishments differentiate wages more strongly within training 
occupations if regional competition for apprenticeship completers in the occupation is stronger. 
A plausible interpretation of this finding is that firms respond to regional competition by incen-
tivizing their best apprentices to stay, while paying relatively low wages to less desirable ap-
prentices (whose wages become sunk costs in the case of non-retention). The wage difference 
between training and skilled work is, not surprisingly, also positively correlated with regional 
competition. Basic controls (establishment size and regional employment density) are presented 
in Tables A5 through A7 in the Appendix, leaving the results largely unchanged.21 Using the 
smaller poaching sample, we obtain very similar results (results available on request). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 log training wage Within-cell SD of 
training wages 
log wage diff. job-
training 
log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0422*** 0.155*** 0.0398*** 
(14.86) (12.24) (11.68) 
    
Constant 3.394*** 0.475*** 3.653*** 
 (45.84) (11.47) (30.41) 
Observations 196697 83510 195752 
R2 0.275 0.056 0.143 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.055 0.142 
Table 3. Wages and regional competition, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. The regression in 
column 2 contains one observation per training cell (establishment, occupation, year). All estimations 
include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor mar-
ket regions, 2-digit occupations). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The results of our wage analysis are thus in line with previous research in that non-retained 
apprenticeship completers are negatively selected on average. Furthermore, we find that train-
ing establishments respond to regional competition by setting and differentiating wages strate-
gically. Higher wages (and wage differentiation) during the last training period in regions with 
higher labor market competition lend additional credibility to our wage-based poaching identi-
fication. The patterns of wages found above can be both cause and consequence of apprentice-
ship completer mobility and poaching. We analyze the training activity of establishments and 
its possible causes, in the following sections. 
                                                          
20 See Table 3 in Mühlemann, Ryan, and Wolter (2013). 
21 Both, regional employment and regional employment density are highly correlated with our competition indi-
cator. At 0.41, the correlation coefficient is lower for the former, which we therefore prefer.  
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6. The impact of regional competition on training, retention, and poaching 
The main empirical part of this paper comprises a set of analyses at the establishment level, the 
level at which decisions on apprentice training, retention, and poaching are made. First, we 
replicate the analyses of previous papers which found that regional competition has a negative 
effect on firms’ training provision. We then analyze the effect of regional competition on the 
mobility of apprenticeship completers and on poaching. According to theoretical predictions 
and empirical findings in the literature (Blatter et al., 2015), we expect that higher labor market 
competition is associated with a lower retention rate after apprenticeship training and a higher 
poaching incidence. Furthermore, we analyze whether poaching victims respond to poaching 
by reducing their training activity. We address each of these questions in a separate subsection. 
6.1 Establishments’ training provision 
First, we investigate training establishments’ (victims’ and controls’) training activity with re-
gard to regional labor market competition. We closely follow the specification of Mühlemann 
and Wolter (2011) and other related studies. Measuring an establishment’s training activity by 
the (log) number of apprentices trained, we estimate the following specification for establish-
ments’ training provision: 
ln⁡(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡
=⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝or𝑡 +⁡𝛽2 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 +⁡𝛽3𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+⁡𝛽4 (
𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1
𝐿𝑖𝑡−1
)⁡+⁡𝛽5 ln(𝑚𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +⁡𝛽6ln𝐿𝑟𝑡
+⁡𝛽7ln⁡(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠)𝑟𝑡 +⁡𝜇𝑜 +⁡𝛿𝑗 + 𝜗𝑡 ⁡+⁡𝜃𝑟 +⁡𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
(1) 
We thus regress the training activity of establishment i in year t on the degree of competition in 
its regional occupational labor market, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝or𝑡, measured as the log density (number per 
square km) of establishments in the same regional occupational labor market.22  
We include as control variables log labor (full-time employment)23 and the share of medium-
qualified workers, which is a good proxy of the share of employees who have completed an 
apprenticeship. Both variables are basic controls for the establishment’s demand for appren-
tices. The main insight from Mohrenweiser et al. (2013) is that establishments’ training and 
retention behavior is determined, inter alia, by temporary up- and downturns. It is therefore 
                                                          
22 Note that the index o may represent more than one training occupation per employer. 
23 We only count full-time employees because the data do not contain working time for part-time employees. Note 
that apprentices are not full-time employees and hence not included in L. 
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important to control for the establishment’s employment growth rate. Further controls include 
the establishment’s log median daily wage of full-time workers and the size (log labor) and 
density (log of employment per square kilometer) of the labor market region r. These controls 
should capture macro-regional effects on training activity that are not due to regional competi-
tion, but to other regional externalities (e.g. the positive and negative effects of agglomeration). 
We also include fixed effects for training occupations (o), industries (j), years (t), and labor 
market regions (r).24 Occupation fixed effects in particular are crucial to capture structural dif-
ferences in supply and demand in the apprenticeship-completer labor market, since apprentice-
ship training contents are strongly occupation-specific. Ideally, standard errors should be clus-
tered at the level of regional occupational labor markets, the level where competition (the key 
explanatory variable) varies. This is impossible, however, since there can be more than one 
training occupation per establishment. We therefore cluster standard errors at the level of re-
gional two-digit industries. Throughout this section, we report results using the narrow poach-
ing sample, since we can perform the core analyses on poaching (section 6.3) only for this 
sample. Analogous results for the baseline sample, where applicable, are reported as robustness 
checks in the Appendix. 
The estimation results, presented in Table 4, reveal a significant negative effect of regional 
competition on establishments’ training provision. All reported estimations include occupation 
fixed effects, which previous studies and our descriptive analysis have found to be crucial con-
trols. Industry and year fixed effects are included in column 2. They add little to the overall 
explanatory power of the model. The same can be said of labor market region fixed effects, 
which are included in column 3. Our findings are qualitatively in line with previous studies. 
They can best be compared to Mühlemann and Wolter (2011), who use data from Switzerland, 
a country whose apprenticeship system is very similar to Germany’s. Mühlemann and Wolter 
(2011) estimate the elasticity of apprentice employment with respect to the density of regional 
competition at around -0.2, about ten times our estimate. This large difference can be mainly 
explained by differences between their estimation sample and ours. In particular, 70 percent of 
their sample establishments do not employ a single apprentice; 99 percent have at most six 
apprentices. In contrast, our estimation sample contains 100 percent training establishments that 
are relatively large and have 34 apprentices on average (some establishments even have more 
than 1,000 apprentices).25 To analyze the impact of the specific sample we use on the regression 
                                                          
24 We identify occupations and industries at the two-digit level, respectively. 
25 These numbers deviate from Table A2, which also includes the hiring establishments (raiders and other hirers). 
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results, we re-run the regressions with our larger baseline sample, see Table A8 in the Appendix. 
This sample also contains relatively large training firms, but also includes more small training 
firms than the poaching sample. The baseline sample yields a highly statistically significant 
elasticity of about -.05. We therefore regard our results as broadly comparable to Mühlemann 
and Wolter’s (2011).  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 log apprentices log apprentices log apprentices 
log estab. density, region-
occupation 
-.0244** -.0194* -.0206** 
(-2.248) (-1.873) (-2.006) 
    
Log labor (full-time) .6122*** .6333*** .6372*** 
 (65.11) (65.52) (65.47) 
    
Share mid-qual. employ-
ees  
.2083*** .1649*** .1678*** 
(3.014) (3.127) (3.137) 
    
Employment growth rate .0655 .0701* .0658* 
 (1.621) (1.751) (1.658) 
    
log median daily wage -.0022 -.0587 -.0723* 
 (-.106) (-1.616) (-1.692) 
    
log employment LM re-
gion 
.0057 8.5e-05 .5086*** 
(.4059) (.0068) (2.729) 
    
log empl. density LM re-
gion 
-.0137 -.0163 .0378 
(-.71) (-.8996) (.3634) 
    
Constant -.9844*** -.0428 -6.604*** 
 (-5.49) (-.1841) (-3.098) 
Observations 21416 21416 21416 
R2 .703 .724 .735 
Adjusted R2 .702 .723 .732 
Table 4: Impact of regional competition on apprenticeship training, poaching sample. t statistics in pa-
rentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Columns 2-3 includes 2-digit indus-
try and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes labor market region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered 
at the region-industry level (labor market regions, 2-digit industries). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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6.2 Analysis of retention 
In a second step, we investigate whether regional competition has a negative effect on the re-
tention of apprenticeship completers by their training establishment. We use the same control 
variables as in equation (1), plus the log number of apprentices, and consider the number of 
movers directly after apprenticeship completion as the dependent variable.26 We thus estimate: 
ln⁡(𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 + ⁡𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝or𝑡 +⁡𝛽2ln⁡(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑜 +⁡𝛿𝑗 +
𝜗𝑡 +⁡𝜃𝑟 +⁡𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
(2) 
The estimation results are displayed in Table 5, where the different specifications are analogous 
to the previous subsection. As expected, we find a positive elasticity for regional competition. 
Furthermore, the elasticity (in absolute values) is in the same order of magnitude as the negative 
effect of competition on training. Thus, the negative training effect of regional competition is 
roughly proportional to its negative retention effect. We run the same regression on the baseline 
sample (Appendix Table A9), and obtain very similar results.27 
  
                                                          
26 Since the number of movers is zero for a large number of observations, we actually use ln(movers + 1). This 
modification has a negligible effect on the results: The correlation between ln(movers) and ln(movers + 1) is 
0.994. 
27 One might object that the number of movers (despite the log transformation corrected for zeros) is not an ideal 
dependent variable for an OLS regression due to the large number of zeros. Thus, we alternatively estimated a 
Probit model with the dependent variable being a dummy for having at least one mover among all apprenticeship 
completers (estimation results available on request). These estimations confirm that there is a strong and signif-
icant negative relationship between regional competition and retention. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 log movers log movers log movers 
log estab. density, region-
occupation 
.0363*** .0315*** .0306*** 
(3.033) (2.765) (2.988) 
    
log apprentices .1689*** .1758*** .1722*** 
 (11.45) (11.22) (11.11) 
    
Log labor (full-time) -.0578*** -.0655*** -.0668*** 
 (-6.161) (-6.611) (-6.382) 
    
Share mid-qual. employ-
ees  
-.0168 -.0213* -.0218* 
(-1.409) (-1.677) (-1.71) 
    
Employment growth rate -.1834*** -.1702*** -.1738*** 
 (-6.45) (-5.913) (-6.056) 
    
log median daily wage -.006 .054** .0755*** 
 (-.4285) (2.254) (2.714) 
    
log employment LM re-
gion 
.025** .0175* .1497 
(2.37) (1.851) (1.11) 
    
log empl. density LM re-
gion 
-.0294* -.0285* -.1241* 
(-1.799) (-1.818) (-1.695) 
    
Constant -.2164* -.4956*** -1.799 
 (-1.836) (-2.886) (-1.139) 
Observations 21416 21416 21416 
R2 .18 .196 .224 
Adjusted R2 .177 .191 .214 
Table 5: Impact of regional competition on retention of apprenticeship completers, poaching sample. t 
statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Columns 2-3 includes 
2-digit industry and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes labor market region fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered at the region-industry level (labor market regions, 2-digit industries). * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
6.3 Poaching analysis 
Our ex-post identification of poaching yields, for each training establishment observation, a 
number of poaching incidents which can be used to estimate the relationship between an estab-
lishment’s regional competition and poaching. The poaching variable is non-negative, integer-
valued, and small but mostly zero (97 percent). Therefore, one might consider estimating a 
count data model. However, count data models are inappropriate if the dependent variable con-
tains a large number of zeros. For the choice of an estimator, furthermore, it is crucial to decide 
whether the data-generating process can be seen as a two-stage decision, and whether the out-
come at the second stage (the number of poached apprenticeship completers, given it is positive) 
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is of interest independently of the first stage (number of poached apprenticeship completers 
positive versus zero). In the current case, there does not seem to be such a decision process, 
since of course establishments do not choose to get poached. Instead, the fact whether a training 
firm experiences poaching or not and the count of poached training completers both represent 
the same kind of event measured on different scales. Given these preconditions, we decide not 
to use a count data or hurdle (two-stage) model. Instead, a binary dependent variable indicating 
whether there is at least one poaching appears as a conservative choice for the dependent vari-
able. We therefore choose to estimate a Probit model. 
We follow the approach of Mohrenweiser et al. (2013) and estimate the probability that estab-
lishment i becomes a poaching victim in year t as follows: 
P(𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚)𝑖𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 + ⁡𝛽1ln(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝or𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +⁡𝜇𝑜 +⁡𝛿𝑗 +
𝜗𝑡 +⁡𝜃𝑟 ⁡+ ⁡𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
(3) 
As in equation (2), we control for the log number of apprentices, which raises the probability 
of observing one or more incidents of poaching. The other control variables are as above.28  
Table 6 provides the average marginal effects (reported as elasticities) from the Probit estima-
tions.29 A number of observations are dropped from all estimations because some of the in-
cluded fixed effects perfectly predict the outcome. Across the three different specifications, we 
find that indeed, regional competition significantly increases training establishments’ risk of 
having at least one apprenticeship completer poached by a competitor. This finding is in line 
with expectations arising from previous studies,30 which attribute the negative effect of regional 
competition on training to an increased risk of poaching. Converted into absolute values, the 
estimated poaching elasticity of about 0.4 implies that a one percent increase in regional com-
petition increases P(victim) by about 0.01 percentage points, or 38 percent of the sample mean 
(the share of poaching victims, 2.6 percent). Since the dependent variable represents a proba-
bility, we cannot directly compare this estimate to the effects found in the estimations for train-
ing (section 6.1) and retention (section 6.2), to assess the importance of poaching (as observed 
ex-post) for establishments’ training decisions. Instead, we investigate the consequences of 
poaching at the level of individual establishments in the next subsection. 
                                                          
28 Since the dependent variable is only defined for establishments which fulfill our potential poaching conditions 
(see section 4.1), we can apply this specification only to the estimation sample of victims and controls (poach-
ing sample) but not to the baseline sample. 
29 We obtain very similar results when estimating a linear probability model (results available on request). 
30 Brunello and Gambarotto (2007), Brunello and De Paola (2008), Mühlemann and Wolter (2011). 
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We would like to point out that we obtain the same results when measuring competition not for 
regional occupational labor markets, but regional two-digit industries analogously to the just-
cited studies on the consequences of regional competition for training. The estimated elasticity 
for establishment density in the regional two-digit industry is around 0.39 and highly significant 
(results available on request). Overall, however, the occupation-based competition measure 
yields more robust estimates than the industry-based measure.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Poaching victim Poaching victim Poaching victim 
log estab. density, region-
occupation 
.4257*** .3964*** .4333*** 
(3.93) (3.551) (3.607) 
    
log apprentices .8355*** .8913*** .8978*** 
 (6.418) (6.835) (6.907) 
    
Log labor (full-time) -.5578*** -.6489*** -.6675*** 
 (-5.642) (-6.233) (-6.176) 
    
Share mid-qual. employ-
ees  
-.2224 -.2605* -.2486* 
(-1.513) (-1.807) (-1.769) 
    
Employment growth rate -2.14*** -2.112*** -2.212*** 
 (-2.809) (-2.768) (-2.832) 
    
log median daily wage .0414 .794** .9971*** 
 (.2415) (2.516) (2.815) 
    
log employment LM re-
gion 
.2026** .1648* 1.96 
(2.254) (1.873) (.7537) 
    
log empl. density LM re-
gion 
-.4479*** -.4718*** -.4351 
(-3.182) (-3.301) (-.2433) 
Observations 20758 20619 19174 
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.103 0.132 
AIC 4815.3 4809.5 4802.1 
BIC 5252.0 5642.5 6453.0 
Table 6: Impact of regional competition on poaching, poaching sample. t statistics in parentheses. Av-
erage marginal effects (elasticities) after Probit. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. 
Columns 2-3 includes 2-digit industry and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes labor market region 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the region-industry level (labor market regions, 2-digit indus-
tries). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In Appendix C, we present the analogous raiding analysis that is a natural robustness check for 
the poaching regression. We confirm the positive effect of regional competition on raiding. This 
finding is not a surprise, however, considering that 70 percent of poached apprenticeship com-
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pleters stay within their labor market region (see Table A1), and that training and hiring estab-
lishments are likely to have similar occupational profiles. As a consequence, the level of re-
gional competition is similar for training and hiring establishments. 
6.4 Training response to poaching 
The previous subsections have established that regional competition negatively affects estab-
lishments’ apprentice training and retention of apprenticeship completers, and that it has a pos-
itive effect on the incidence of poaching. However, it remains to be shown whether poaching 
victims react to poaching by training fewer apprentices. A reduction of training after poaching 
would suggest a causal link running from regional competition to poaching and further to lower 
apprentice training of the affected training establishments.  
Given the results of Mohrenweiser et al. (2013), whose analysis of the training response we 
partly replicate in this section, we expect that poaching victims do not adjust their training ac-
tivities downward in response to past poaching. Figures A3 through A5 in the Appendix display 
changes of relevant variables during the period from three years before until three years after a 
poaching event. Figure A3 shows that the share of apprentices is somewhat (but not signifi-
cantly) higher during the poaching year than in the years before and after. In contrast, the re-
tention rate (Figure A4) and employment (Figure A5) drop significantly in the year of poaching. 
These patterns suggest that poaching occurs during temporary downturns of the training em-
ployer, as found by Mohrenweiser et al. (2013). These downturns force training establishments 
to lay off workers and not to retain apprenticeship completers. The figures indicate that training 
establishments refrain from laying off apprentices in general, but they concentrate on laying off 
apprenticeship completers, instead. Firing apprentices is legally extremely hard once the pro-
bationary period (at most four months) is over.31 In addition, given the low wages apprentices 
receive, firing them would not reduce labor costs much. Furthermore, apprentices’ employment 
contracts expire on the day the final exam is passed. It is therefore relatively cheap and socially 
accepted to get rid of apprentices once they have completed their training. As a result, the ap-
prentice share increases slightly in that year. However, poaching does not seem to change es-
tablishments’ usual training behavior because the retention rate and the apprenticeship share 
                                                          
31 The Federal Vocational Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz) contains a number of additional requirements, as 
compared to the Employment Protection Law (Kündigungsschutzgesetz), for laying off apprentices after the 
probationary period. In particular, apprentices may only be laid off for “important reasons” such as theft, severe 
misconduct in the workplace, etc. 
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quickly return to their normal levels, in tandem with the increase in employment, in the years 
after poaching. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Share appren-
tice hires 
Share appren-
tice hires 
log growth ap-
prentices 
log growth ap-
prentices 
L.victim 0.00056 0.000076 -.001 -.0085 
 (.8441) (.1386) (-.0647) (-.6463) 
     
L2.victim -0.0002 -0.00021 -.0139 -.0091 
 (-.2876) (-.3788) (-.8543) (-.6669) 
     
L3.victim -0.00012 0.00016 -.0034 .0059 
 (-.1715) (.2733) (-.1968) (.4127) 
     
log apprentices  .0203***  .457*** 
  (43.69)  (40.23) 
     
Log labor (full-
time) 
 -.023***  -.2687*** 
 (-23.67)  (-11.5) 
     
Share mid-qual. 
employees  
 -.0015***  -.0123* 
 (-4.913)  (-1.691) 
     
Employment 
growth rate 
 .0212***  .6786*** 
 (15.77)  (21.05) 
     
log median daily 
wage 
 .0014  .002 
 (.5857)  (.0355) 
     
log employment 
LM region 
 .0158**  -.0919 
 (2.105)  (-.5118) 
     
log empl. density 
LM region 
 -.009**  -.0816 
 (-2.014)  (-.7624) 
     
Constant .0259*** -.0647 -.0101*** 1.606 
 (247.2) (-.7598) (-4.046) (.7858) 
Observations 6644 6644 6642 6642 
R2 0.00018 .323 0.00014 .309 
Adjusted R2 -.284 .128 -.285 .11 
Table 7: Reaction of poaching victims in terms of training activity, poaching sample. t statistics in pa-
rentheses. Fixed effects (within-establishment) estimates. Columns 2 and 4 include year fixed effects. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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We also confirm the multivariate results of Mohrenweiser et al. (2013) that poaching victims 
do not reduce their training activity after poaching (see Table 7). The dependent variable in 
these estimations is the share of apprentice hires in all employees (columns 1 and 2) respectively 
the log growth rate of the stock of apprentices (ln(apprentices in year t) minus ln(apprentices in 
year t-1); columns 3 and 4). The estimates again suggest that training effort does not change in 
the years following the poaching incident. 
7. Implications for the economics of apprentice training 
In our empirical analysis, we confirm previous literature that regional labor market competition 
is negatively correlated with establishments’ apprentice training activity, and positively with 
apprenticeship completers’ job mobility and wages. We complement this finding with new ev-
idence that there is a positive effect of regional competition on actual poaching.  With less than 
three percent of apprenticeship completers being affected, poaching is however a rare and not 
systematic phenomenon. In addition, poaching does not appear to have any effect on the ap-
prentice training strategy of the victims. Thus, it does not seem to be the actual poaching inci-
dence which discourages firms in competitive regional labor markets from training apprentices. 
In this section, we add to the few papers that discuss alternative channels that explain the neg-
ative training effect of regional competition, in addition to the threat of poaching. 
First, not only realized poaching might influence firms’ training strategies, but also the per-
ceived threat of poaching. Previous studies have only discussed this threat (or probability) of 
poaching, which is supposed to increase with regional labor market competition. Naturally, the 
mere threat of poaching cannot be observed in empirical data, which is why we use an ex-post 
definition of poaching. We might however assume that actual incidents of poaching influence 
the perception of training firms about the poaching threat. In this context, the market for ap-
prenticeship completers can be regarded as a contestable market (for a survey of the relevant 
literature, see Brock, 1983). That is, employers can enter this market at no cost, whereas training 
establishments have incurred sunk costs for their training investment. The market for appren-
ticeship completers clearly is contestable in this sense. Overall, thus, the threat of poaching 
might have a stronger effect on training activity of firms in competitive regions than actual 
poaching. 
The second important factor that differs between regions is the lower general retention rate of 
apprenticeship completers in more competitive regions, see section 6.2. That is, establishments 
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in highly competitive regions might train fewer apprentices because they expect to retain a 
lower share of them, whether due to poaching or other kinds of outflows. A theoretical founda-
tion for this relationship is provided, for example, by the model developed by Smits and Strom-
back (2001). This model suggests that the incentive of firms to invest in apprenticeship training 
is positively influenced, inter alia, by the retention rate of apprenticeship completers.32  
Smits and Stromback’s (2001) model furthermore emphasizes the importance of apprentices’ 
productivity (and the degree to which it can be exploited through wage compression) for train-
ing profitability. Regarding the importance of regional competition, however, what appears 
crucial for firms’ training decisions is not apprentices’ (and apprenticeship completers’) 
productivity per se, but the productivity of apprentices who are retained compared to those who 
move elsewhere. We do not have data on apprentices’ productivity. We can, however, use wage 
data to learn about the relative productivity of movers and stayers, assuming that training wages 
reflect productivity. Although movers are generally negatively selected (see section 5 and pre-
vious studies), this negative selection might be less pronounced in more competitive regional 
labor markets, where apprenticeship completers are more likely to find a better job match by 
moving to a competitor and where retention rates are lower. Previous empirical studies suggest 
that indeed, there is a positive relationship between regional competition and the individual 
productivity of moving workers. For instance, Andersson and Thulin (2013) find that regional 
density increases the mobility of higher qualified workers more than the mobility of lower qual-
ification groups. We therefore investigate whether there are productivity differences between 
moving apprenticeship completers in more and less competitive regions.  
Taking training wages as a productivity signal, we regress wages on a dummy for movers, the 
regional competition indicator, and an interaction term of the two (see Table 8, column 1).33 
We find that movers earn higher training wages in highly competitive regions than in less com-
petitive regions, suggesting they are less negatively selected where regional competition is 
stronger. In column 2, we control for the size of the training establishment and the training 
region, as well as the average wage in the training region.34 Establishment size in particular is 
an important driver of monopsony power and hence, wages (Manning, 2011). These additional 
                                                          
32 The profit function from apprenticeship training in Smits and Stromback (2001) is defined as Π = -w1 – c(h) + 
(1-q) (h-w2), with Π profits, w1 apprentice earnings, c apprenticeship costs, q retention probability, h productivity 
of apprentices, and w2 skilled wage. A broader discussion of the profitability of apprenticeships, focusing on 
Germany and Switzerland, is provided by Mühlemann and Wolter (2014), who emphasize the role of national 
institutions and firm characteristics, rather than the regional environment. 
33 We use the baseline sample because the poaching variable is not needed here. We obtain qualitatively the same 
results using the poaching sample, see Table A10 in the Appendix. 
34 The average wage in the training region is defined as the average of establishment-level median wages. 
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controls leave our results almost unchanged. A major concern in the literature on wages and 
regional labor market competition is the fact that living costs, employer characteristics and la-
bor market competition may be correlated and affect wages jointly (Boal and Ransom, 1997). 
Note, however, that this problem applies to agglomeration effects (which we control for by 
including region-level employment and wages) but not necessarily to regional competition. 
Nevertheless, to ensure that our results are not driven by such correlations, we exclude inter-
regional movers in column 3, which leads to a minor sample restriction given that most em-
ployer changes are intra-regional. Again, this leaves the estimates mostly unchanged. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 log training wage log training wage log training wage 
Mover -0.0226*** -0.0183*** -0.0136** 
 (-4.07) (-3.23) (-2.11) 
    
log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0414*** 0.0114*** 0.0115*** 
 (14.99) (4.25) (4.37) 
    
Mover*log firm density 
reg.-occ. 
0.0105*** 0.00854** 0.0164*** 
(2.61) (2.25) (3.80) 
    
log full-time employment, 
training estab. 
 0.0436*** 0.0441*** 
 (17.28) (17.89) 
    
log employment, training 
region 
 -0.0144*** -0.0143*** 
 (-3.06) (-3.03) 
    
log avg. wage, training 
region 
 0.348*** 0.346*** 
 (9.16) (9.03) 
    
Constant 3.392*** 1.849*** 1.855*** 
 (45.79) (10.84) (10.91) 
Observations 196697 196500 190349 
R2 0.276 0.350 0.350 
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.350 0.349 
Table 8. Training wage differences between retained and moving apprenticeship completers by regional 
competition, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market region of training establish-
ment, 2-digit occupations). Column 3 excludes interregional movers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
We also consider apprenticeship completers’ training wages relative to the mean in their train-
ing cell in Table 9.35 The results also indicate that movers are less negatively selected from 
among their peers if their training establishment is located in a highly competitive region. The 
                                                          
35 Analogous regression results for the poaching sample in Appendix Table A11. 
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effect is only marginally significant (column 1) and drops below conventional significance lev-
els if inter-regional movers are excluded as a robustness check (column 2).36 Still, the estimates 
point in the same direction as those for the absolute training wage and therefore do not invali-
date our interpretation that movers in highly competitive regions are relatively favorably se-
lected. Our findings therefore imply that a relatively large number and abler apprenticeship 
completers can be hired by external firms in more competitive regions, which is a disincentive 
to train own apprentices. Similar to previous studies (Mühlemann, Ryan, and Wolter, 2013), 
our findings also suggest that the higher training costs implied by higher apprentice wages, 
which are largely sunk costs if apprentices move after training, deter employers in competitive 
regions from training.  
 (1) (2) 
 Training wage rel. to cell 
mean 
Training wage rel. to cell 
mean 
Mover -0.203*** -0.223*** 
 (-2.96) (-2.76) 
   
log firm density reg.-occ. -0.00254 0.00250 
(-0.97) (1.00) 
   
Mover*log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0467* 0.0288 
(1.68) (0.97) 
   
Constant -0.00694 0.00684 
 (-0.97) (0.99) 
Observations 196697 190529 
R2 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 -0.000 -0.000 
Table 9: Training wage position, differences between retained and moving apprenticeship completers 
by regional competition, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit oc-
cupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market region of train-
ing establishment, 2-digit occupations). Column 2 excludes interregional movers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
Additional to the relative quality and wage costs of apprentices, firms’ training decisions are 
likely influenced by the wage costs of young skilled workers. An important topic discussed in 
the literature is the negative impact of fewness within regional (occupational) labor markets on 
wages of trained employees (Boal and Ransom, 1997; Manning, 2011; Mühlemann et al., 2013). 
Monopsony power is mainly measured within regions if employees’ mobility costs are high, 
and within occupations if there are strong demarcation lines between occupations. Cases in 
                                                          
36 Due to the definition of the relative training wage (wage position within training the establishment), we do not 
include establishment- or region-level controls. 
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point are remote mining towns, nurses, and teachers (Boal and Ransom, 1997; Benson, 2013). 
Regional and occupational barriers are well documented for the labor market of apprenticeship 
completers (Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Mühlemann et al., 2013). 
Many studies relate regional monopsony power to incentives to train and they concentrate on 
wage differences between unskilled and skilled employees (Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1998). Mühlemann et al. (2013) for example show that there is a positive effect of the 
number of regional employers on the wages of skilled employees and apprentices, an effect that 
is absent for unskilled employees. Analogously, wage differences between skilled and unskilled 
employees increase with the number of firms in a region. In contrast, the difference between 
skilled and apprentice wages is not affected.  
From the perspective of firms that have to decide whether to train themselves instead of hiring 
apprenticeship completers (mainly) from their regional occupational labor market, however, the 
wage difference between externally hired and own apprenticeship completers should be more 
important than the wage difference between trained and untrained workers. We therefore com-
pare the entry wages of movers and stayers, net of their previous training wages (also compare 
Table 3), in the context of regional competition. Subtracting the training wage from the skilled 
entry wage has the advantage that training wages control for productivity during training, thus 
yielding a wage indicator corrected for individual productivity. Regression results are reported 
in Table 10.37 Again, the main regressor of interest is the interaction between the mover dummy 
and regional competition. We find a significant negative coefficient for this term, meaning that 
movers in highly competitive regions obtain lower wage increases between training and their 
first skilled job than movers in less competitive regions. This finding is robust across different 
specifications: In column 2, we include the size of the hiring establishment and its region, as 
well as the regional wage level. In column 3, we include the same variables of the training 
establishments, since the dependent variable is determined in both the training and hiring es-
tablishments. Finally, in column 4, we again restrict the sample to stayers and intra-regional 
movers, to rule out endogeneity bias from inter-regional differences in costs of living and 
wages.38 At first sight, our results appear to be at odds with our earlier finding that movers are 
a relatively good selection in competitive regions. Note, however, that the wage difference be-
                                                          
37 See Table A12 in the Appendix for results using the poaching sample. 
38 Obviously, the training and hiring region are the same in this subsample. We therefore omit the training region 
controls in column 4. 
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tween training and skilled work already accounts for differences in individual quality. We there-
fore argue that movers’ effective wage costs as skilled workers (taking into account their higher 
productivity as apprentices) are relatively low in competitive regions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log wage diff. 
job-training 
log wage diff. 
job-training 
log wage diff. 
job-training 
log wage diff. 
job-training 
Mover -0.0868*** 0.00209 -0.0147 0.00468 
 (-7.26) (0.17) (-1.43) (0.35) 
     
log firm density 
reg.-occ. 
0.0418*** 0.00106 0.000891 -0.000418 
(12.36) (0.34) (0.28) (-0.13) 
     
Mover*log firm 
density reg.-occ. 
-0.0221*** -0.0222*** -0.0211*** -0.0291*** 
(-3.98) (-3.79) (-3.67) (-4.22) 
     
log full-time em-
ployment, hiring es-
tab. 
 0.0694*** 0.0557*** 0.0700*** 
 (23.20) (12.06) (22.93) 
     
log employment, 
hiring region 
 -0.0141** -0.00933 -0.0128** 
 (-2.57) (-1.02) (-2.28) 
     
log avg. wage, hir-
ing region 
 0.394*** 0.475*** 0.388*** 
 (9.12) (4.59) (8.94) 
     
log full-time em-
ployment, training 
estab. 
  0.0152***  
  (3.06)  
     
log employment, 
training region 
  -0.00541  
  (-0.61)  
     
log avg. wage, train-
ing region 
  -0.0852  
  (-0.87)  
     
Constant 3.658*** 1.806*** 1.826*** 1.809*** 
 (30.47) (8.07) (8.05) (8.01) 
Observations 195752 195539 195495 189469 
R2 0.145 0.208 0.209 0.210 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.208 0.208 0.210 
Table 10: Wage increase between training and skilled job, differences between retained and moving 
apprenticeship completers by regional competition, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. All esti-
mations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level 
(labor market region of hiring establishment, 2-digit occupations). Column 4 excludes interregional 
movers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Our findings on wage differences between the last training period and the first wage as skilled 
employee also imply that higher regional labor market competition is associated with less op-
portunities for training firms to reduce skilled entry wages for their apprenticeship completers. 
Our findings finally reflect a recurring topic in regional economics – that agglomerations or 
“thick” regional labor markets allow for better firm-worker matching (Manning, 2011). Espe-
cially regarding apprenticeship completers, who are regionally not very mobile, the better sup-
ply of apprenticeship completers (from other firms) in dense regions may be a potent reason 
not to invest as much in own training. This interpretation receives further support from the 
literature: Blatter et al. (2015) investigate the costs of hiring skilled workers in Switzerland. 
They find that training activity and the retention of own apprenticeship completers positively 
depend on external hiring costs. Our data do not contain direct hiring costs and therefore we 
cannot investigate their effect on training and hiring decisions.39 We might argue, however, that 
the “pure hiring costs” beyond the wage offer necessary to attract skilled employees, such as 
advertising or the hiring procedure itself, are probably lower in dense regional labor markets, 
because it is not necessary to look for candidates working and living in another regional labor 
market. Overcoming mobility barriers in order to attract new employees from other labor mar-
ket regions seems to be especially costly for apprenticeship completers in Germany, as indicated 
by their low level of inter-regional mobility. Mühlemann et al. (2015) in addition find that re-
cruitment costs in Germany decrease with the regional supply of apprenticeship completers. 
The last reason for lower hiring costs in agglomerations is the higher average quality of job 
candidates, meaning that less “lemons” have to be screened before finding a good match (Blat-
ter et al., 2015). 
Overall, we therefore conclude that the negative effect of regional competition on apprentice 
training works not only through the negative agglomeration effect of an increased poaching 
risk. It also works through the better availability of externally trained apprenticeship complet-
ers, a commonly positively perceived agglomeration effect. Other important aspects are a better 
selection, higher training costs, and relatively low labor and hiring costs of available appren-
ticeship completers. These additional reasons for lower training in more competitive regions 
have been discussed mainly in theoretical contributions so far. The few empirical contributions 
concentrated on one of the mechanisms analyzed here. Our paper therefore presents the first 
                                                          
39 Another obstacle to replicate the Blatter et al. (2015) study is that we do not observe external hiring establish-
ments’ (raiders’ and other hirers’) own apprentice training in the same detail as for the sampled training estab-
lishments (victims and controls). A full analysis of the training behaviour of raiding firms would require a larger 
and even more complex data base. Future work might pursue this kind of analysis. 
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systematic empirical analysis of potential transmission channels between regional competition 
and training investments. It finds evidence for all the channels proposed in the literature, but 
reveals that poaching externalities are relatively unimportant. 
8. Conclusions 
We investigate whether poaching of apprenticeship completers in Germany is related to the 
regional labor market competition which training establishments face. We aim to contribute to 
a growing literature which suggests that regional labor market competition deters firms’ train-
ing activity and claims that this is a consequence of firms’ fear of having trained workers 
poached by competitors. Yet, none of these studies addresses the incidence of poaching directly. 
We apply an ex-post identification of poaching to address this gap in the empirical literature. 
Therein, we exploit the institutional design of the German apprenticeship system, which fea-
tures training that is transferable between employers active in the same occupational labor mar-
ket. In addition, individual trained workers’ quality can be credibly shown by graded certifi-
cates. 
Similar to previous studies, we find that the relationship between regional competition and Ger-
man establishments’ apprentice training efforts is significantly negative. Also in line with pre-
vious evidence, we find that regional competition decreases the retention of apprenticeship 
completers by their training firms. We finally find that poaching is positively associated with 
regional labor market competition. Endogeneity, in particular in the form of reverse causality, 
is unlikely to be a major problem in our estimations, as regional levels of competition are un-
likely to be affected by the observed incidents of poaching in a labor market region. We also 
show that firms in competitive regions are more likely to “raid” apprenticeship completers 
(commit poaching). The last finding largely reflects the fact that more than 70 percent of ap-
prenticeship completers stay in the same labor market region when they change employers, 
which makes regions a suitable dimension for the analysis of competition in the first place. 
However, we do not find poaching events to have any effect on victims’ subsequent training 
behavior. We therefore seek to provide alternative explanations for the negative training effect 
of regional competition. We argue that certainly the (unmeasurable) threat of poaching might 
play a role. Yet more important might be regional differences that apply to all employer movers 
instead of differences that only concern the tiny group of poached apprenticeship completers. 
We find analogously to mainly theoretical papers that the retention rate is structurally lower in 
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highly competitive labor market regions. Besides the higher availability of apprenticeship com-
pleters willing to move to another employer, this employee group is less adversely selected in 
more competitive regions. As more productive apprentices are more expensive, personnel costs 
of training firms are higher in competitive regions. Finally, hiring and (entry) wage costs of 
apprenticeship completers trained elsewhere are lower when we take into account their higher 
productivity. These differences all reduce the attractiveness of own training efforts in regions 
with a strong labor market competition.  
We therefore conclude that it is not actual poaching of apprenticeship completers that drives 
the lower training rates in highly competitive regional labor markets. Instead, the better availa-
bility and quality of apprenticeship completers who are willing to change their employer di-
rectly after training, and the lower hiring and wage costs of apprenticeship completers who 
move to another employer, seem to be more important. 
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Appendix A 
 
A: Poaching sample Mean SD Min Max N 
Stayer 0.925 0.264 0.000 1.000 134602 
Interregional mover 0.212 0.408 0.000 1.000 10127 
Poached mover 0.084 0.278 0.000 1.000 10127 
Interregional poaching 0.299 0.458 0.000 1.000 855 
Age 21.479 2.010 17.000 52.000 134602 
Female 0.338 0.473 0.000 1.000 134602 
Duration of apprenticeship 1068.275 159.715 700.000 1492.000 134602 
Training wage 32.923 9.030 8.915 82.053 134602 
First-job wage 80.274 17.706 10.406 490.424 134602 
Wage difference job - training 47.350 17.279 -32.538 461.585 134602 
Training wage rel. to cell mean -0.000 3.856 -41.135 43.072 134602 
B: Baseline sample      
Stayer 0.886 0.318 0.000 1.000 196697 
Interregional mover 0.275 0.447 0.000 1.000 22415 
Age 21.535 2.109 17.000 53.000 196697 
Female 0.340 0.474 0.000 1.000 196697 
Duration of apprenticeship 1068.327 158.556 700.000 1492.000 196697 
Training wage 34.126 10.241 8.823 96.593 196697 
First-job wage 82.799 21.425 10.011 482.386 196697 
Wage difference job - training 48.673 19.161 -40.956 447.772 196697 
Training wage rel. to cell mean 0.000 3.648 -48.575 48.071 196697 
Table A1. Summary statistics for apprenticeship completers. 
 
Establishments (poaching sample) Mean SD Min Max N 
Apprentices 27.966 64.855 0.000 1944.000 27039 
Apprenticeship completers 6.285 9.736 1.000 356.000 21416 
Movers 0.473 2.338 0.000 73.000 21416 
Poachings 0.040 0.383 0.000 22.000 21416 
Ext. appr. completer hires 1.754 2.986 1.000 65.000 5623 
Raidings 0.145 0.615 0.000 18.000 5623 
log estab. density, region-occupation -0.823 1.641 -7.375 3.315 27039 
log estab. density, region-industry -2.445 1.620 -8.417 1.959 27039 
Employees 629.158 1889.555 3.000 53391.000 27039 
Full-time employment 523.681 1675.053 1.000 49438.000 27039 
Share mid-qual. employees  0.815 0.307 -7.000 20.000 27039 
Employment growth rate 0.026 0.135 -0.317 1.313 27039 
Median full-time daily wage 103.747 26.891 18.079 187.133 27039 
East Germany 0.157 0.364 0.000 1.000 27039 
log employment LM region 12.676 0.913 9.875 14.201 27039 
log empl. density LM region 4.697 0.779 2.540 6.679 27039 
Share apprentice hires 0.027 0.021 0.000 0.226 21416 
Table A2. Summary statistics for establishments (poaching sample). Apprenticeship completers, movers and poached 
employees only defined for training establishments. External apprenticeship completer hires and raided employees only 
defined for external hiring establishments. 
  
II 
 
Establishments (baseline sample) Mean SD Min Max N 
Apprentices 15.668 45.178 0.000 1944.000 72402 
Apprenticeship completers 3.373 7.011 1.000 367.000 58632 
Movers 0.401 2.299 0.000 171.000 58632 
Ext. appr. completer hires 1.534 3.454 1.000 192.000 13770 
log estab. density, region-occupation -0.737 1.572 -7.375 3.315 72402 
log estab. density, region-industry -1.964 1.708 -8.625 2.129 72402 
Employees 336.062 1274.026 1.000 53391.000 72402 
Full-time employment 275.059 1121.906 0.000 49438.000 72402 
Share mid-qual. employees  0.830 0.394 -16.000 20.000 72402 
Employment growth rate 0.038 0.265 -1.000 6.000 72402 
Median full-time daily wage 84.696 27.805 1.430 245.400 72136 
East Germany 0.201 0.400 0.000 1.000 72402 
log employment LM region 12.647 0.934 9.875 14.201 72402 
log empl. density LM region 4.646 0.788 2.540 6.679 72402 
Table A3. Summary statistics for establishments (baseline sample). Apprenticeship completers and movers only defined 
for training establishments. External apprenticeship completer hires only defined for external hiring establishments. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log training wage log training wage log training wage Training wage rel. 
to cell mean 
Mover -0.00630 -0.00819 -0.0104 -0.256** 
 (-0.62) (-0.84) (-1.05) (-2.24) 
     
log full-time employ-
ment, estab. 
 0.0401*** 0.0359***  
 (11.10) (9.13)  
     
log empl. density, region   0.0242***  
   (4.04)  
     
Constant 3.377*** 3.115*** 3.017*** 0.00511 
 (85.76) (57.05) (53.11) (1.08) 
Observations 134602 134602 134602 134602 
R2 0.204 0.247 0.252 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.247 0.252 -0.000 
Table A4: Training wage differences between apprenticeship completers who move and stay with their training 
employers, poaching sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Stand-
ard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market regions, 2-digit occupations). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 log training wage log training wage log training wage 
log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0422*** 0.0238*** 0.0208*** 
 (14.86) (8.47) (8.05) 
    
log full-time employment  0.0467*** 0.0464*** 
  (19.76) (19.17) 
    
log employment, region   0.00682 
   (1.44) 
    
Constant 3.394*** 3.200*** 3.105*** 
 (45.84) (44.50) (33.20) 
Observations 196697 196500 196500 
R2 0.275 0.338 0.338 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.337 0.338 
Table A5: Training wages by regional labor competition, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. Reduction of ob-
servation number in column 2 due to establishments with zero full-time employees. All estimations include 2-digit 
occupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market regions, 2-digit occupa-
tions). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Within-cell SD of 
training wages 
Within-cell SD of 
training wages 
Within-cell SD of 
training wages 
log firm density reg.-occ. 0.155*** 0.0558*** 0.0211 
 (12.24) (5.01) (1.60) 
    
log full-time employment  0.329*** 0.329*** 
  (27.12) (27.35) 
    
log employment, region   0.0834*** 
   (4.34) 
    
Constant 0.475*** -0.793*** -1.960*** 
 (11.47) (-6.97) (-6.23) 
Observations 83510 83314 83314 
R2 0.056 0.100 0.101 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.099 0.100 
Table A6: Standard deviations of training wages in cell by regional labor competition, baseline sample. t statistics in 
parentheses. Reduction of observation number in column 2 due to establishments with zero full-time employees. All 
estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market 
regions, 2-digit occupations). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 log wage diff. job-
training 
log wage diff. job-
training 
log wage diff. job-
training 
log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0398*** 0.0128*** 0.00806*** 
 (11.68) (4.09) (2.72) 
    
log full-time employment  0.0715*** 0.0711*** 
  (23.26) (22.90) 
    
log employment, region   0.0115** 
   (2.01) 
    
Constant 3.653*** 3.359*** 3.198*** 
 (30.41) (27.97) (22.49) 
Observations 195752 195539 195539 
R2 0.143 0.202 0.202 
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.201 0.202 
Table A7: Differences between first skilled wages and training wages by labor market competition, baseline sample. t 
statistics in parentheses. Reduction of observation number in column 2 due to establishments with zero full-time em-
ployees. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level 
(labor market regions, 2-digit occupations). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 log apprentices log apprentices log apprentices 
log estab. density, region-oc-
cupation 
-.0433*** -.0496*** -.0455*** 
(-5.838) (-7.043) (-6.502) 
    
Log labor (full-time) .5487*** .5703*** .5709*** 
 (82.59) (80.88) (79.74) 
    
Share mid-qual. employees  .1398*** .1219*** .1241*** 
 (6.29) (6.199) (6.161) 
    
Employment growth rate .0898*** .0874*** .0864*** 
 (4.391) (4.257) (4.224) 
    
log median daily wage -5.4e-04 .0149 .0035 
 (-.0238) (.6468) (.1368) 
    
log employment LM region -.007 -.0121 .374*** 
 (-.616) (-1.283) (2.669) 
    
log empl. density LM region .0189 .0192 .0024 
 (1.322) (1.471) (.0302) 
    
Constant -.7948*** -.0101 -4.638*** 
 (-5.705) (-.0478) (-2.988) 
Observations 58436 58436 58436 
R2 .696 .711 .716 
Adjusted R2 .695 .71 .714 
Table A8: Impact of regional competition on apprenticeship training, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. All 
estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Columns 2-3 includes 2-digit industry and year fixed effects. Col-
umn 3 includes labor market region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the region-industry level (labor market 
regions, 2-digit industries). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 log movers log movers log movers 
log estab. density, region-oc-
cupation 
.0238*** .0189*** .0198*** 
(3.784) (3.222) (3.4) 
    
log apprentices .1161*** .1139*** .1142*** 
 (18.04) (17.42) (17.69) 
    
Log labor (full-time) -.0421*** -.0393*** -.0406*** 
 (-10.98) (-10.65) (-10.87) 
    
Share mid-qual. employees  .0013 -6.4e-04 -.0026 
 (.359) (-.1702) (-.6758) 
    
Employment growth rate -.1821*** -.1846*** -.1804*** 
 (-15.02) (-15.57) (-15.22) 
    
log median daily wage .0424*** .0436*** .061*** 
 (3.516) (3.959) (5.018) 
    
log employment LM region .0261*** .0218*** .138* 
 (4.368) (4.09) (1.72) 
    
log empl. density LM region -.0308*** -.0266*** -.0812 
 (-3.647) (-3.373) (-1.548) 
    
Constant -.3745*** -.1362 -1.422 
 (-5.04) (-1.248) (-1.587) 
Observations 58436 58436 58436 
R2 .168 .181 .189 
Adjusted R2 .167 .179 .186 
Table A9. Impact of regional competition on retention, baseline sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations in-
clude 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Columns 2-3 includes 2-digit industry and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes 
labor market region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the region-industry level (labor market regions, 2-digit 
industries). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 log training wage log training wage log training wage 
Mover 0.00146 -0.00304 -0.00203 
 (0.17) (-0.37) (-0.21) 
    
log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0287*** 0.00252 0.00280 
 (9.21) (0.80) (0.90) 
    
Mover*log firm density reg.-
occ. 
0.0154** 0.0154** 0.0218*** 
(2.19) (2.38) (3.10) 
    
log full-time employment, 
training estab. 
 0.0302*** 0.0301*** 
 (6.83) (7.00) 
    
log employment, training re-
gion 
 -0.0219*** -0.0217*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.72) 
    
log avg. wage, training region  0.474*** 0.473*** 
  (10.46) (10.50) 
    
Constant 3.370*** 1.393*** 1.393*** 
 (96.86) (6.96) (7.06) 
Observations 134602 134482 132341 
R2 0.220 0.279 0.279 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.279 0.278 
Table A10: Training wage differences between retained and moving apprenticeship completers by regional competition, 
poaching sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at region-occupation level (labor market region of training establishment, 2-digit occupations). Column 3 ex-
cludes interregional movers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Training wage rel. to cell 
mean 
Training wage rel. to cell 
mean 
Mover -0.215* -0.239* 
 (-1.95) (-1.92) 
   
log firm density reg.-occ. -0.00168 0.00393 
(-0.65) (1.40) 
   
Mover*log firm density reg.-occ. 0.0577 0.0405 
(1.27) (0.88) 
   
Constant 0.00339 0.00296 
 (0.92) (0.85) 
Observations 134602 132460 
R2 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 -0.000 -0.000 
Table A11: Training wage position, differences between retained and moving apprenticeship completers by regional 
competition, poaching sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed effects. Stand-
ard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market region of training establishment, 2-digit occupations). Col-
umn 2 excludes interregional movers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log wage diff. 
job-training 
log wage diff. 
job-training 
log wage diff. 
job-training 
log wage diff. 
job-training 
Mover -0.0590** 0.0226 0.0159 0.0190 
 (-2.57) (0.96) (0.88) (0.79) 
     
log firm density reg.-
occ. 
0.0298*** -0.00841* -0.00842* -0.00922** 
(7.31) (-1.96) (-1.93) (-2.19) 
     
Mover*log firm density 
reg.-occ. 
-0.0224** -0.0288*** -0.0302*** -0.0380*** 
(-2.53) (-3.26) (-3.22) (-3.57) 
     
log full-time employ-
ment, hiring estab. 
 0.0574*** 0.0534*** 0.0577*** 
 (11.76) (6.34) (11.59) 
     
log employment, hiring 
region 
 -0.0240*** 0.00159 -0.0234*** 
 (-3.26) (0.08) (-3.13) 
     
log avg. wage, hiring 
region 
 0.542*** 0.477** 0.540*** 
 (9.29) (2.20) (9.26) 
     
log full-time employ-
ment, training estab. 
  0.00452  
  (0.46)  
     
log employment, train-
ing region 
  -0.0260  
  (-1.32)  
     
log avg. wage, training 
region 
  0.0640  
  (0.31)  
     
Constant 3.734*** 1.305*** 1.313*** 1.304*** 
 (31.97) (4.81) (4.81) (4.81) 
Observations 134102 133976 133975 131863 
R2 0.133 0.179 0.179 0.181 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.179 0.179 0.180 
Table A12: Wage increase between training and skilled job, differences between retained and moving apprenticeship 
completers by regional competition, poaching sample. t statistics in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit occu-
pation fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at region-occupation level (labor market region of hiring establishment, 
2-digit occupations). Column 4 excludes interregional movers. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Figure A1: Share of movers in all apprenticeship completers in the estimation sample (1999-2010). 
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Figure A2: Share of poachings in all apprenticeship completers in the estimation sample (1999-2010). 
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Figure A3. Apprentice share by year for one-time poaching victims (0 = year of poaching).  
Means and 95% confidence intervals. Unbalanced panel of 317 poaching victims (N = 1,280). 
 
Figure A4. Retention rate by year for one-time poaching victims (0 = year of poaching).  
Means and 95% confidence intervals. Unbalanced panel of 317 poaching victims (N = 1,280). 
 
Figure A5. Log employment by year for one-time poaching victims (0 = year of poaching).  
Means and 95% confidence intervals. Unbalanced panel of 317 poaching victims (N = 1,280).  
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Appendix B 
Spurious worker mobility 
To rule out spurious job moves of apprenticeship completers (mainly establishment changes within a 
firm), we use a procedure developed by Schäffler (2014). This procedure identifies which establish-
ments most likely belong to the same firm and excludes worker flows between such establishments 
because they should not be subject to “normal” employer competition.40 The assignment of establish-
ment IDs in the IAB data also implies that the entry or exit of IDs need not reflect true openings or 
closures of establishments, but may also indicate changes of owner, acquisitions, spin-offs, restruc-
turings, or other events in which worker transitions between establishment IDs are probably due to 
decisions taken at the firm or establishment level, rather than the worker level. Therefore, also such 
worker transitions do not reflect true worker mobility between competing employers. We use a file 
produced by Hethey and Schmieder (2010) which contains, for all establishment IDs and the years of 
the first and last appearance of that ID, the likely cause of its (dis-)appearance. We exclude moves 
between establishment IDs that are likely due to spin-offs, closures or acquisitions of the training 
establishment, or other establishment ID changes in completers’ employment records that most likely 
do not reflect real worker mobility. In a further data cleaning step, we also drop remaining clusters of 
apprenticeship completers’ establishment ID changes that appear to be too large to be considered as 
individual mobility decisions by the workers. 
  
                                                          
40 The method proposed by Schäffler (2014) requires the use of de-anonymized data: Establishments’ firm affiliation is derived from 
their names and addresses. We thank Steffen Kaimer (IAB) for carrying out this procedure for us and providing us with an anon-
ymous file containing an estimated firm ID for every establishment ID and year. 
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 Poaching 
sample 
Baseline sam-
ple 
Individual and cell level (apprenticeship completers) 
1a Apprenticeship duration 700-1,500 days Yes Yes 
1b Begin and end dates of apprenticeship in a plausible calendar month 
(regular apprenticeship year) 
Yes Yes 
2 Deletion of wage outliers (less than 50 or more than 200 percent of 
mean wage in the same training occupation and year) 
Yes Yes 
3 All completers must transition into full-time employment Yes Yes 
4 At least two apprenticeship completers in establishment/occupa-
tion/year cell 
Yes No 
5a Deletion of training establishments with zero stayers Yes No 
5b Deletion of spurious interfirm mobility (rule out within-firm estab-
lishment changes) 
Yes Yes 
6a All completers must transition into full-time employment within 10 
days 
Yes (Yes: 30 in-
stead of 10 
days) 
6b All completers must transition into full-time employment within the 
same 2-digit occupation 
Yes Yes 
7 Drop if first-job wage < 10€ or > 500€ Yes Yes 
Establishment level (training establishments) 
I Deletion of outlier establishment observations in terms of apprentice 
share in total employment, i.e. observations above the 99th percentile 
Yes Yes 
II Deletion of top percentile of establishment observations in terms of 
employment growth 
Yes Yes 
III Only services and manufacturing Yes Yes 
Establishment level (hiring establishments) 
I Deletion of outlier establishment observations in terms of apprentice 
share in total employment, i.e. observations above the 99th percentile 
Yes Yes 
II Deletion of top percentile of establishment observations in terms of 
employment growth 
Yes Yes 
III Only services and manufacturing Yes Yes 
Table B1: Overview of sample construction steps in poaching and baseline sample. 
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Appendix C 
Raiding analysis 
To exploit our identification of poaching further, we also consider the effects of regional labor market 
competition from the perspective of the hiring establishments. The estimation sample now consists 
of raiders and other hirers, all of which hire at least one external apprenticeship completer (see Figure 
2). Inevitably, this reduces the estimation sample size considerably. We can estimate a specification 
analogous to equation (3) but with the dependent variable being the probability of “raiding” at least 
one apprenticeship completer from another establishment, and controlling for the number of exter-
nally hired apprenticeship completers, rather than the number of own apprentices: 
P(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 + ⁡𝛽1 ln(𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟_ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝or𝑡 + ⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +⁡𝜇𝑜
+⁡𝛿𝑗 + 𝜗𝑡 +⁡𝜃𝑟⁡ 
+⁡𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
(4) 
Note that there is one important difference to the above estimations, rooted in the change of perspec-
tive from training to external hiring establishments. From a training establishments’ perspective, all 
its apprenticeship completers are potential poaching targets (ignoring for the moment the details of 
our poaching definition). From the perspective of external hirers, all apprenticeship completers within 
geographical reach (say, within the same labor market region) and in relevant occupations are poten-
tial raiding targets. We observe the potential total number of poaching victims only for the training 
establishments. For the external hirers, we observe only the actually hired external apprenticeship 
completers.41 It is plausible to assume that the actually hired apprenticeship completers constitute a 
positive selection from all those the external establishment could have hired. As a consequence (and 
confirming this assumption), the share of raidings in all observed potential raidings (external appren-
ticeship completer hires) is relatively high, at 8.4 percent. For comparison, the training establish-
ments’ share of poachings in all potential poachings (apprenticeship completers) is only 0.67 percent. 
Hence, we expect the estimated effect of competition on raiding to be much larger than the effect on 
being a poaching victim.  
This said, estimation results are presented in Table C1. The estimates are indeed much larger than 
those from the poaching estimation. In absolute values, a one percent increase in competition in-
creases the raiding probability by about 0.1 percentage points, about ten times the estimate of the 
poaching effect, a factor roughly proportionate to the extent to which the share of raidings in all 
                                                          
41 Furthermore, we only observe the subset of hires from the observed training establishments (victims and controls). See section 
4.2 and Figure 2 in particular. 
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potential raidings is overstated, as just discussed. Therefore, we find that the effect of regional com-
petition on poaching and raiding (which are, after all, the same thing viewed from different perspec-
tives) is closer to the poaching estimate (plus 0.01 percentage points for a one percent increase in 
competition). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Raider Raider Raider 
log estab. density, region-oc-
cupation 
.9756*** 1.059*** 1.135*** 
(6.168) (6.75) (6.675) 
    
log ext. appr. completer hires .4297*** .489*** .5551*** 
(4.44) (4.892) (5.774) 
    
Log labor (full-time) .0616* .0207 .0336 
 (1.765) (.5557) (.868) 
    
Share mid-qual. employees  -.0964 .0616 .0986 
(-.5477) (.3402) (.5009) 
    
Employment growth rate .0161 .2755 .2573 
 (.0699) (1.134) (1.025) 
    
log median daily wage .3257** 1.081*** 1.232*** 
 (2.471) (5.732) (5.929) 
    
log employment LM region .2077** .2262*** .2711 
(2.491) (2.624) (.0836) 
    
log empl. density LM region -1.147*** -1.245*** -1.334 
(-6.209) (-6.592) (-.6038) 
Observations 5747 5723 5490 
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.124 0.160 
AIC 3614.0 3594.6 3615.8 
BIC 3893.6 4200.0 4904.8 
Table C1: Impact of regional competition on raiding, external hiring establishments from the poaching sample. t statis-
tics in parentheses. Average marginal effects (elasticities) after Probit. All estimations include 2-digit occupation fixed 
effects. Columns 2-3 includes 2-digit industry and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes labor market region fixed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at the region-industry level (labor market regions, 2-digit industries). * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
